This chapter offers a critical constructivist interpretation of the legislative phase of international politics and international public law manifest in the treaty making process.
This paper is a post-print of a chapter published in: Christian Reus-Smit (eds.), The Politics of International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2004) , 80-105. The definitive version is available at: http://www.cambridge.org/uk/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=0521546710 constitutive tensions between the regulative ideals of treaty law and the actual production of treaty law. Such an approach offers both a sociological understanding of the legitimacy of international legal norms as well as a critical framework that enables an evaluation of the degree of legitimacy of particular treaty negotiations and outcomes from the perspective of both state and non-state actors.
Mainstream rationalist approaches to treaty making take the distribution of material capabilities and/or interests of states in the context of a fixed structure and logic of international anarchy as a sufficient explanation of treaty processes and outcomes. While the structure of international society is anarchic, in the sense that there is no world government to enforce international legal norms, I argue that it is too limiting to assume that there is only one mode or rationality of interaction among states under anarchy (i.e., Hobbesian and Lockean respectively). Instead I suggest that understanding state interaction in international society as multicultural rather than unicultural provides the crucial context for understanding why it is that particular states (as well as particular coalitions of state and non-state actors) are likely to relate to others as enemies, rivals or friends, and why particular agreements are likely to be struck, or come unstuck. That is, different historically specific 'cultures of relating' provide the context for understanding the sorts of interaction (i.e. non-cooperation, coercion, bargaining and/or moral argument) that are likely to prevail within and across different groupings of actors in the formal and informal discursive processes of treaty making. Now it might be argued that the climate change negotiations pose an especially hard case for those who seek to resist both the neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist understandings of international politics and law. After all, the negotiations have been characterised by intense political disagreement and self-interested bargaining by states to protect economic and strategic interests, the assertion by the US of its position as a great power, and general delay in terms of concrete outcomes. However, I show that it is possible to criticise these mainstream explanations as unnecessarily reductionist without denying the obvious significance of power and interests, especially the role of the US in the negotiations, and without denying the importance of the sway of domestic factors vis-à-vis discursive argument in international meetings in shaping outcomes. After providing a brief overview of the climate change negotiations I therefore launch my defence of critical constructivism by posing some hard questions for neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists arising out of the climate change negotiations. I then seek to show how critical constructivism -in its This paper is a post-print of a chapter published in: Christian Reus-Smit (eds.), The Politics of International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2004) , 80-105. The definitive version is available at: http://www.cambridge.org/uk/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=0521546710 sensitivity to the role of both state and non-state actors in treaty negotiations, and its openness to the play of not only power and interest but also morality and identity -is able to provide a more rounded understanding of the climate change negotiations than mainstream rationalist approaches.
The climate change negotiations: Some hard questions for neorealists and neoliberals
The international climate change negotiations provide an especially graphic illustration of the multifaceted challenges that typically confront attempts to develop common political norms and global environmental regulations. At issue are debates over a highly technical science, different climatic vulnerability and different costs of adaption and capacities to respond on the part of different states, intense debates over the rules of adjustment and burden sharing, and fundamental normative disagreements over environment and development priorities.
Moreover, any serious and concerted effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions necessarily entails measures that strike at the heart of the domestic policies of states, including energy, industry, transport, infrastructure development, taxation and pricing policy. For many states, any attempt to regulate such 'domestic' matters is tantamount to an infringement of their sovereignty. Nonetheless, against these enormous odds, a principled agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions has been reached by a majority of states, and developed countries have agreed to take the first practical steps to reduce emissions.
The basic objective of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which opened for signature in 1992 at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, is for the parties to achieve 'stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system' (Article 2) and within a time-frame sufficient to protect ecosystems, food production and economic development. Moreover, the Convention also established basic principles of equitable burden sharing in Article 3, the most significant being that the parties should protect the climate system 'in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities'; that developed countries should take the lead in combating climate change;
and that full consideration should be given to the specific needs and special circumstances of developing countries, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. This paper is a post-print of a chapter published in: Christian Reus-Smit (eds.), compliance system; and unresolved issues around sinks and other Kyoto mechanisms. 6 Russia's delay in ratifying the Protocol has been partly due to the withdrawal of the US, which Russia expected would be a major purchaser of its carbon credits. However, Russia still stands to benefit from the carbon trading arrangements despite the US withdrawal. 7 As noted, the US also played a major role in preventing the inclusion of specific timetables and targets in the 1992 UNFCCC, but this initial success has clearly been superceded by events.
This paper is a post-print of a chapter published in: Christian Reus-Smit (eds.), Neoliberal institutionalists, in contrast, would analyse the problem in functional terms as a major 'collective action' failure on the grounds that the incentive structures created by the climate regime were not sufficient to induce cooperation of the single biggest greenhouse gas emitter. Neoliberal institutionalists typically determine whether a state will be a leader, a bystander or a laggard in environmental regime negotiations on the basis of relative ecological vulnerability and abatement costs. 8 So, for example, if abatement costs are too high, then states are unlikely to cooperate in environmental treaties. That is, irrespective of three changes of President (from George Bush senior, to Bill Clinton, to George Bush junior), the fundamental reliance of the US economy on fossil fuels meant that agreeing to binding commitments towards emissions reductions was always going to be an unlikely prospect because it conflicted with US 'interests'.
In view of the foregoing analyses, the climate change treaty negotiations might appear to pose an easy case for neorealists and neoliberals and an especially hard case for critical constructivists. However, these cursory analyses tell only part of the climate change story while also obscuring a number of weaknesses in the neorealists' and neoliberal institutionalists' analysis. Moreover, the highly contingent character of the negotiations is such that the force of the neorealist understanding of law and politics can be found to wax and wane at different points (for example, waxing at Rio in 1992 in the light of the 'soft' character of the commitments extracted by the US, waning at Kyoto in 1997 when these commitments 'hardened', waxing at the Hague in 2000 when the negotiations broke down, waning at Bonn when the negotiations were rescued despite the absence of the US, and waning as the number of ratifications of the Protocol steadily increase). This precarious neorealist hold on the changing fortunes of the treaty suggests some fundamental limitations in the neorealist analysis. Here I shall single out for attention two questions to which neorealists (and neoliberal institutionalists) do not have easy answers.
First, why did the US move from its negotiating position of stabilisation of emissions to agree to a 7 per cent cut at Kyoto in 1997 and drop its insistence that developing countries should also commit themselves to emissions reductions when neither of these agreements This paper is a post-print of a chapter published in: Christian Reus-Smit (eds.), Turning to the neoliberal explanation, it might be argued that the details of the incentive structures created by the climate change regime were not sufficient to motivate the US to join, since joining would generate economic losses. The EU, on the other hand, as the 'green leader' of the negotiations, stood to gain because it was not only vulnerable to the impacts of climate change (like most countries) but (unlike most countries) it had already geared its economy towards a more energy efficient future relative to other states and stood to reap the economic benefits of being one of the first movers in 'ecological modernisation'.
Indeed, these points were exploited in the negotiations by the Umbrella group, which sought to tarnish the green reputation of the EU by pointing out that its relatively good emissions record has been achieved by coincidental rather than deliberate developments. In particular, the closure of many East German industries following German reunification and the restructuring of the British energy industry, gave Germany and Britain respective relatively impressive emission reductions records.
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For neoliberals institutionalists, that the US chose to become involved, and remain in, the negotiations until as late as 2001 may be explained in terms of the US's concern to shape the UNFCCC and the Protocol (and any subsequent action plans) in a way that gave it maximum flexibility in meeting its targets. The soft-law character of the UNFCCC commitments are not considered significant because, in game-theoretic terms, 'play is still in the pre-game phase', 13 meaning that the 'real action' (i.e., the hard bargaining about who pays) has not begun. When the 'real game' began, the US made trade-offs at Kyoto that it was unable to fulfil. According to Robert Putnam's two-level game analysis, the inability of the US to ratify the Kyoto commitments is a case of 'involuntary defection'. 14 George Bush junior simply turned this into a voluntary defection. Yet these neoliberal responses to the two questions only go part of the way to explaining the negotiation processes and outcomes to date. While neoliberalism provides a more plausible explanation than neorealism of the treaty negotiations and outcomes, it nonetheless remains limited since it assumes that state interests remained fixed during the negotiating process and that the regime negotiations and outcomes merely provide incentives that change behaviour but otherwise had no influence on fundamental interests and identities/social roles. Yet the US's social role has not been uniform throughout the negotiations. Rather, it shifted its position in the face of the negotiations at Kyoto in 1997.
Moreover, it is too early to judge whether the subsequent withdrawal of the US has in fact led to a 'collective action failure', although the weight of evidence so far suggests that it is not a failure. The entry into force of the Protocol is now imminent, with Russia on the brink of ratification. While it is premature to make any final pronouncements about the success (or otherwise) of the negotiations it is nonetheless possible to offer some alternative reflections on the relationship between politics and law in relation to what has now been over a decade of negotiations. As we shall see, this entails building upon but also reframing the rationalist emphasis on power and interests by drawing attention to the issues of identity, morality and legitimacy that are typically neglected in the rationalist analyses.
Critical constructivism explained and defended
A critical constructivist understanding of international politics and law begins with an understanding of the constitutional structure of treaty making, which constitutes states as juridically recognised entities and structures the norms of recognition and procedural justice that apply in the processes of treaty making. The regulative ideals embedded in this constitutional structure are essentially contractual in that the creation of mutually binding norms and rules follows procedures that are intended to enable common understandings between states to emerge by means of free, not forced, consent. Practical discourse (which includes both strategic bargaining and moral argument) is thus essential to the effectiveness and legitimacy of international treaties. Whereas democratic states are accountable to their societies by a relatively dense set of understandings and obligations that serve to limit state power, the relationships between the state actors formally involved in international treaty making and international civil society are relatively thinner and more tenuous. The identities and interests of states are therefore likely to be shaped to a considerable degree by domestic This paper is a post-print of a chapter published in: Christian Reus-Smit (eds.), the treaty making process -an involvement that has introduced a challenge to the statecentric character of treaty making, both in terms of the actual negotiations and the regulative ideals. Such an involvement may, over time, possibly lead to more inclusive norms of communicative justice in treaty making.
The critical dimension and the question of legitimacy
Habermas's recent analysis of the relationship between law and politics provides the most extended analysis of the constitutive tensions between the regulative ideals and practices of law making while also providing a critical dimension that transcends the state-centric, contractual regulative ideal of international treaty making and holds out a more inclusive and rational ideal of political communication. For Habermas, in modern times, law has a dual character: it provides the substantive and formal rules to stabilise, integrate and regulate society as well as the procedural requirements to ensure the legitimacy of those regulations.
The rationality and legitimacy of legal norms are derived from the mutual respect accorded to the argumentative rules, roles and contexts that define the discussion leading to the creation of legal norms. Although Habermas has directed his study to the democratic legitimation of state legal systems, his reconstruction of law and politics contains significant insights that can be enlisted to illuminate the international legal order.
The first insight concerns his understanding of the unavoidable tensions between law making ideals and practices. For Habermas, 'law has a legitimating force only so long as it can function as a resource for justice'. 16 This is not a wishful normative claim but rather a quasi-empirical claim, reconstructed from the implicit presuppositions of communicative action, most notably, the implicit orientation of actors towards resolving practical disagreements by seeking mutual understanding through discursive argument. 17 While in practice there is typically a gap between 'facts' and 'norms', between the actual production of positive law and its animating rationale, for neorealists merely to expose the obvious lack of fit between the legislative ideals and the practice of treaty making in order to argue that the ideals are weak or irrelevant is to misunderstand the way in which regulative ideals work. While some observers have considered the discourse ethic to be fundamentally at odds with the processes of treaty making between sovereign states in international relations,
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This paper is a post-print of a chapter published in: Christian Reus-Smit (eds.), life-worlds where bargaining usually predominates, moral discourses can still be incorporated into rule making procedures, and, indirectly, into the modes of argument employed by the parties. That is, even in those circumstances where strategic bargaining looms large, the legitimacy of any resulting compromise agreement still turns on the fairness of the bargaining conditions. In this context, the discourse principle -normally oriented towards consensus -must be brought to bear indirectly, through fair procedures which regulate the bargaining. 20 Moreover, bargaining often relies, in the first instance, on prior understandings about particular facets of the world (such as scientific understandings) that are not value neutral, often uncertain and typically contestable. Establishing the parameters of such understanding for the purposes of bargaining invariably takes the discussion beyond the boundaries of instrumental rationality, 21 and requires a hermeneutic explication of worldviews and self-understandings on the part of claimants. It is noteworthy that Habermas considers ecological questions to 'push beyond contested interests and values and engage the participants in a process of self-understanding by which they become reflectively aware of the deeper consonances (Ubereinstimmungen) in a common form of life'.
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A related insight arising out of critical theory's attention to discursive processes concerns the relationship between the formal processes of law making and the informal processes of political opinion formation in the public sphere. For Habermas, political will formation (i.e. law making) and political opinion formation are mutually informing processes that are shaped by a complex web of political actors, both state and non-state. We can also see this on the international stage 23 even though the formal lines of accountability and responsibility between the officially recognised state treaty negotiators and domestic and global civil society remain weak and ill-defined. That is, these lines of accountability and responsibility can still be found to work in diffuse and indirect ways. While states are the only juridically recognised entities in the treaty making process, in practice they are by no means the sole instigators, authors, subjects and enforcers of international law, a recognition that calls for a less state-centric framework for understanding the relationship between international law and international society. Indeed, treaty making has increasingly become a major arena for discursive battles about the future shape of international society for both state and non-state actors. Clearly, power and self-interest remain crucial to any critical constructivist understanding of treaty making. However, unlike neorealism and neoliberalism, critical constructivism is also sensitive to the sway of moral argument while providing a critical framework for historicising and evaluating the legitimacy of particular negotiations and outcomes. However, Habermas's reconstructive theory does not seek to understand why it is that power, interests and/or moral arguments come to prevail at different times. To understand the orientation of particular actors to negotiations, and their preparedness to respond to different types of argument in efforts to negotiate common norms, it is also necessary to explore the ways in which history, tradition, social roles, ideology and practical precedents shape the dialogue and provide the context for those arguments that come to prevail.
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The constructivist dimension and the question of identity
Earlier, we noted that states are enmeshed in different international social structures in varying degrees, and that these types of enmeshment influence the modes of interaction (for example, coercion, bargaining or moral argument) pursued by states in treaty negotiations.
Wendt's analysis of the different 'cultures of anarchy' in the international community is especially pertinent in this regard since it explores the sociological phenomenon of relating to others in the context of historical relationships that have helped to produce different social roles and corresponding 'cultures of relating'. In the case study we will see how such an understanding sheds considerable light on the different social roles played by the EU and the US in the climate change negotiations.
Neorealists and neoliberals assume that the anarchic character of international society is such that states will always behave in mistrustful and/or instrumental ways. Against these assumptions, Wendt has argued that just as different social structures can produce different social roles and identities, and different modes of relating, so too can different 'cultures of anarchy' produce different state roles and relationships. For example, Wendt shows how states may relate to other states as enemy, rival or friend and these roles correspond to three different 'cultures' of international politics -Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian (these are identified by Wendt as 'salient' logics and therefore need not be taken as exhaustive).
Moreover, these different cultures of anarchy explain why states, when they inhabit certain roles, conform to certain behaviours. That is, when they relate to other states as enemies they 24 Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions, p. 33. This paper is a post-print of a chapter published in: Christian Reus-Smit (eds.), are only likely to 'cooperate' with others when implicitly or explicitly coerced; when they relate as rivals they tend to comply mostly out of self-interest; and when they relate as friends they comply principally because of shared and 'internalised' understandings. Below, I
explain how special considerations apply to powerful states; that is, when they relate to other states in their role of 'world leader' they are more likely to set an example by conforming to multilateral norms (both procedural and substantive) than when they relate to other states simply in their capacity as 'a great power' (where they can act unilaterally and with impunity). We might also expect that moral reasoning might, potentially at least, play a bigger role than instrumental reasoning in political communication between the 'friends', given the greater depth of association and shared understandings, although this point is not explored by Wendt. It is also quite possible, however, that pragmatic reasoning would continue to occur in relation to the minutae of agreements, albeit against a larger background of shared moral/ethical understandings.
Wendt makes it clear that the existence of a Kantian culture of relating among sovereign states need not necessarily imply that there are not important differences and disagreements among states; rather it simply means that states mostly relate to each other as friends rather than rivals or enemies. Here 'friendship' is understood as a 'role structure' whereby disputes are settled without war or threat of war and mutual aid is provided to members in the face of external threat. 25 This relationship of friendship is said to be more enduring than the relationship between allies, which is more contingent and precarious.
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Friendship is based on a shared knowledge and history of the other's peaceful intentions. In such circumstances, cooperation cannot be reduced to material self-interest but can only be understood in terms of the mutual internalisation of shared norms. That is, the conception and welfare of the 'self' is taken to include others in the community. 27 However, this identification with the other is rarely total since actors, including state leaders, typically have multiple identities 28 and this is especially so for the leaders of hegemonic states, as we shall see. We can therefore expect contestation and some resistance to surface among members over shared understandings, including debates about free riding and burden sharing in any negotiations over common problems. Although Wendt restricts his analysis of the 'culture of friendship' to collective security communities, we might expect members of a 'Kantian security team' (such as the EU) to find it easier to reach agreement about other common This paper is a post-print of a chapter published in: Christian Reus-Smit (eds.), (defined in terms of international leadership, understood as a social property rather than something that arises merely from superior material capability). A hegemonic state is a state that is able to shape the international order according to norms and rules that mostly suit its interests but which are defended and more or less accepted by others as universal in conception. However, in assuming a leadership role in such an order, a hegemonic state is also bound to conform to such norms and rules in order to set an example and uphold the legitimacy of the order, even when they conflict with its short term interests. That is, while leadership provides greater influence on the multilateral norms and rules it also brings with it a greater responsibility to conform to the generalised rules of conduct. Wendt's analysis helps to give this understanding historical specificity by suggesting that the international community should be understood as made up of many different constellations of states with different 'cultures' and modes of relating to 'the other'. This suggests that we need to look at historical patterns of engagement of different states and the associated social roles and forms of interaction before we can understand whether moral arguments (that is, generalisable claims that are acceptable to differently situated parties) are likely to gain any purchase vis-à-vis bargaining, coercion or non-cooperation in particular negotiations.
A closer look at the climate change negotiations
To those who might insist that the climate change negotiations can only be understood in terms of power and/or interest, critical constructivists would point to the ways in which power and interests have been framed and disciplined by moral argument in the negotiations.
As we have seen, critical constructivists understand so-called 'real world politics' as typically combining these different modes of interaction, with the consequence that the distinctiveness of any one of these different modes should not be over-emphasised at the expense of This paper is a post-print of a chapter published in: Christian Reus-Smit (eds.), understanding the various ways in which they may act upon and qualify each other. 32 Of particular interest here is the way in which the form of the UNFCCC had, initially at least, helped to facilitate a temporal and analytical separation between the negotiation of basic norms and principles in the framework document and the subsequent negotiation of binding commitments and more detailed rules (such as the Kyoto Protocol) in subsequent conferences of the Parties (COPs). Indeed, the Protocol itself required further specification on many contentious matters, specification that the parties were unable to achieve at the COP6 at the Hague but were able to mostly resolve at the Bonn meeting. The degree to which the negotiating parties (particularly the greener states but also many developing states) continued to refer back to the agreed foundation principles in the UNFCCC provides significant evidence of their enduring normative force and legitimacy in the face of attempts to undermine them in the subsequent and more testing negotiations over the details of binding commitments and detailed rules. The core environmental justice principle of 'common but differentiated responsibility' and the related principle that the developed countries should take the lead are fundamentally moral norms -a point that is often ignored in the more cynical analyses of the hard-headed politics of adjustment and burden sharing that have subsequently taken place, where selfish haggling has predominated and it is therefore presumed that moral arguments have lost their relevance. Yet moral norms remained a fundamental backdrop for the negotiations, they framed and set limits to the more selfish politics of haggling over burden sharing and adjustment, and they help to explain why certain arguments (including many put forward by countries, such as the US, with a strong fossil fuel dependency) were ruled out. Indeed, there are few better ways of demonstrating the influence of moral norms than when they are agreed to despite the strenuous, self-serving lobbying of powerful states. The attempt by US negotiators at Kyoto to seek greater developing country involvement was effectively rejected because it was outside the basic principles and objectives of the UNFCCC.
For all the shortcomings of the climate change treaty, then, it nonetheless demonstrates -contra neorealists -that treaties are not always just a tool for the powerful.
While the persuasive force of moral argument is always precarious in the face of the force of brute military and economic power, both weak and strong states need to respect the prevailing norms of communicative justice if they are to be recognised as legitimate members
